Juan Carlos Muñoz-Mora

Among 806 smallholder households in Antioquia, Colombia, only 28% adopt at least one climate adaptation strategy despite widespread exposure to climate risk. We estimate two logistic regression models—one for overall adaptation and one for land-focused adaptation among landowners—with explanatory variables selected via group LASSO. Each additional unit on a six-item climate perception index raises the adaptation probability by 6.5% points in Model 1 and 6.9% points in Model 2. Education, land assets, and access to basic services further predict adoption. Households with better housing conditions—a proxy for wealth—are less likely to adopt land-based strategies, suggesting that wealthier households diversify livelihoods rather than adapt farming practices. Both models show adequate calibration (Hosmer–Lemeshow ¡mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" overflow="scroll"¿ ¡mml:mrow¿ ¡mml:mi¿p¡/mml:mi¿ ¡mml:mo»¡/mml:mo¿ ¡mml:mn¿0.14¡/mml:mn¿ ¡/mml:mrow¿ ¡/mml:math¿ ) and good discriminatory power (AUC: 0.79 and 0.84). These patterns call for differentiated interventions: targeted information campaigns, financial products matched to adaptive investment scales, and support for the community institutions that diffuse adaptive knowledge.

Given institutional incentives, is entrepreneurship always good for the economy? While the literature about its benefits for society is extensive, a salient lacuna exists regarding the negative side of entrepreneurship. This study, hence, explores how institutions condition destructive entrepreneurial activity, which is linked to the economic growth of Colombian regions. Institutional economics helps us understand the underlying relationships, which are tested through 3SLS, on a sample of 1122 municipalities in Colombia. We show that a negative effect of new coca crops (as destructive entrepreneurship) on regional economic growth exists, but it is conditioned by the institutional reinforcement and integral performance index (as formal institutions), as well as historical land conflict and hectares of land belonging to religious sects (as informal institutions). Other forms of (destructive) entrepreneurship are therefore envisioned and put in place for the continued development of the current literature and the management of public policy.

Objetives The adoption of vaccines was a crucial factor in overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic. However, vaccination rates between rural and urban areas varied greatly. In this paper, our objective is to understand the individual and institutional factors associated with the uptake of vaccines in remote rural areas in Colombia. Methods We interviewed a random sample of 800 households (1,592 individuals) in remote rural areas of Antioquia (Colombia) during February 2022 when vaccinations were available. Then, we use a linear probability model to explain the uptake of the COVID-19 vaccine. Results The results indicate that the probability of having at least the first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine is positively associated with access to information, trust in police and army, and the perceived risk of contracting COVID-19. Trust in the church is negatively related to vaccination. Conclusion Institutions can play a critical role in the management of pandemics. Timely information on the risks associated with the disease and perceived riskiness are key factors that mobilize the population to take the COVID-19 vaccine.

How are patterns of armed control and dispute by armed actors related to land concentration, land property rights, and distribution? We argue that armed actors affect land tenure by using different land transfer mechanisms to distribute the land, which reflects the dynamics of control and dispute during civil conflict. We test this argument by studying the case of Urabá, a region in northwestern Colombia, using a mixed-method strategy. First, using extensive qualitative fieldwork, we find that armed actors systematically applied different land transfer mechanisms in areas where they held control. Armed actors strategically changed from employing one land transfer mechanism to another in relation to the level of dispute, political and economic objectives, and alignment with the state, among others. In our fieldwork, we identify how these land transfer mechanisms led to patterns of territorial control and land tenure structure. We then analyze an original dataset of rural plot ownership in Urabá, based on official cadastral information, to empirically verify our qualitative findings. We estimate a village-level fixed effects model that shows that disputed territories and those under paramilitary control had larger plots, higher land inequality, and fewer land transfers. In contrast, territories with established control by left-wing insurgents exhibit a small landholder scheme. These results offer important insights into the relationship between civil armed conflict and land and the logic of rebel governance.